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SPEECH 



OF 




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HON. JAMESBUCMANAN, 

OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

IN SUPPORT OF THE VETO POWER, 

IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY, OF KENTUCKY. V ' 



DELIVERED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, WEDNESDAY, FEB. 2, 1842. 



Mf. BUCHANAN being eniitled to the floor, 

ddressed the Senate as follows: 
Mr. President: I am now sorry that I ever co^- 
wiitled my. elf to make a speech upon this subject. 
. assure you that it has become extremely cold; 
md I ihink I never shall again pledge myselt to 
.iddress the Senate at the end of a week or ten 
.lays, to be occupied in the discussion of an in'.er- 
rening and different question. Cold as the subject 
!iad becotne, it is now still colder, afier having 
.yaited for an hour to hear a debate on the mere 
•jference of a memorial to the Committee on Com- 
merce. But although the subject may have lest 
ts freshness to ray mind, and 1 may not be able to 
•tply to the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay] 
•tith as much effect as if the discussion on the 
.'iankfupf bill had not intervened, yet it has lost 
^ione of it;; inirin-ic importi^nce. 
Before I commence the discussion, however, let 
le clearly .?.nd disiincily stale the question to be 
ecided by the Senate. 

Under the Constitution of the United States, as 
i\. now existj — 

"Every bill which shall have passed the House of Represent- 

;Wes and ihe Senate, shall, before it become a law, be present- 

1 to the President of the United Slates; il' he ap|-irove. he shall 

j.'?n it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that 

;^ouse in which it shall have originated, whosiiall enter the ob- 

Mictions at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. // 

, /Ver such reconsideTation tieo thirds of that House shall 

ttgree to pass the bill, it shall be. sent, togtiher with the 

^djections, to the other House, by which it shall li/cewise be re- 

nsidered, and if approved by iteo thirds of that House, it 

mU become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both 

[louses shall be determined by yeas and nay?, and the names of 

he persons voting for and against the bill, shall be entereil on 

[he Journal of each Ilouee respectively. If any bill shall not be 

eturoed by the President wiihin ten days (Sundays excepted) 

ifter it shall have been presented to him, the eanne shall be a 

aw, in like nianner as if he had signed ii, unless the Congress, 

ly their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall 

lOtbe a law." 

Tbe same cons'.itational rule is applicable to 



"every order, resolation, or vote to which the con- 
currence of the Senate and House of Representa- 
tives may be necessary, except on a ques^icn of ad- 
journment." 

The joint resolution offered by the Senator, pro- 
poses to change the existing Constixuiion, so as to 
require but a bare majority of all the members be 
longing to each House to pass any bill into a law* 
notwithstanding the President's otj^ctioHs. 

The question then is, whether the Constitution 
ought to be so amended as to require bt»t a bare 
majority of all the members of each Hause, instead 
of two-;hinls of each House, to overrule the Presi- 
dent's veto; and, in my opinion, there never was a 
more important question presented to the Senate. 
Is it wise, or is it republican, to make ihis funda- 
mental change in our institutions? 

The great Whig p?,r'y of the cou:itry have iden- 
tified themselves, m the most solemn mar.n?r, with 
this proposffd amendment. Feelirg sensibly, by 
sad experience, that they had suffered since the late 
Pretideniiai election, from not having previously 
presented a clear exposition of their princ pies "to 
the public eye," they determined no longer to suffer 
fro.-n this cause. Accordingly, the conscript fathers 
of the church assembled in conveniion at the city of 
WaJhington, on the 13th September last— at the 

cl»se of the ever memorable extra session and 

adopted an address to the people of the United 
States. This manifesto contains a distinct avowal 
of the articles of their creed; and, first and fore- 
most among them all, is a deaunciation of the' 
veto power. I shall refer very briefly to this 
address; although to use the language of my friend 
the present Governor of Kentucky, it contains 
much good reading. So exasperated were the feel- 
ings 0/ the party then, and so deeply were they 
pledged to the abolition ol the veto power, that 



3 



they solemnly and formally read John Tyler out 
of the Whig churclf, because he had exercised it 
against the bills to establish "a fiscal agent" and a 
"'fiscal corporation" of the United States, The 
form of eacommunicalion bears a resemblanca lo 
the Drclaration of Independence which severed 
this couniry forever from Great Britain. I shall 
give it in their own emphatic language. They de- 
clare thai Jv hn Tyler — 

"By the course he has adopted in respect to the applicaiion 
of the veto power to two successive bank charters, each of 
which there was just reason to believe would meet his apjiro- 
bation; by the withdrawal of confidence from his real friends 
in Congress and from the members of his Cabinet; by the be- 
stowal of it upon others notwilhsiandingtheir notorious oppo- 
sition to leading measures of his Administration, has voluntari- 
ly separated himself from those by whcs>^ exertions and suf- 
frages he was elevated to that office through which he reached 
his present exalted station," &c. <fcc. 

After a long preamble, they proceed to specify 
the daties which t^;e Whig party are bonnd to per- 
form 10 ihe counlry, and at ihe verj head ol ihtse 
duties, Ihe desiruction of tLe veto power conlained 
in the Gonssiiution stands prominently conspicu- 
ous. The folio 70 ing is, the langunge which they 
have employed: 

"First. A reduction of the Executive power, by a further 
limitation of the veto, so as to secure obedience to the public 
will, as that shall be expressed by the immediate Kepresen- 
tatives of ihe people and the States, with no other control than 
that which is indispensable to avert hasty or unconstitutional 
legislation." 

/ Mark me, sir, the object is not to secure cb"- 
dience to the public will as exprevacd by the peo- 
ple ibe:aiselve>, the isource of all political power; 
but as expounded by their Senators and Represen- 
tatives in Congress. 

After eiiumo-rating other duties, they declare that 
"to the e-aeciuation oi these objects ought ihe exer- 
tions ti' il-.e Whigs to be hereafter directed." Anil 
they make a direct appeal to the people by an- 
nouncing that "those only should be cboien mem- 
bers oi Congress who are willirig cordially to co- 
operai' in the accomplishoicnt-of them." Twentv 
thovi;-.ini1 copies of this mani'c.to vere ordered to 
be prai.cd aL-.d circulated among tiie people of the 
United Siates. 

This appeal to the people, sir, was a vain one. 
The avowal of their principles destroyed them. 
The people did not come to the rei-cue. Never 
was tbe.e a more di-a?trous defeat than theirs, at 
the laS' i;;ll elections, so immediately after their 
triuffiph-iint victory. Thank Fleaven ! the people 
have nit thus far responded to this appeal,, and 1 
trust tuCY may nevtr consent to abolish the veto 
power. Sir, the Democratic party in regard to this 
power, in the lat^guage of the doughty Barons of 
England, centuries age, are not willing that the 
charter of their liberties shall be charged. We 
shall hold on to this veto power as one of the most 
efFectut;! ssf-guards of the Union, and one- of the 
surest means of carrying into effect the will of the 
people. 

In my humble judgment, the wise statesman 
ought equally to avoid a foolish veneration for 
ancient institutions oa the one hand, and a restless 
desire i^■s: charge on the other. In this respect, the 
middle is the safer course. Too great a venetation 
for antiquity would have kept mankind in bondage; 
and the plea of despots acd tyrants, in every age, 
has been, that the wisdom of past geuerations has 



established institutions which the people ought not 
to touch with a sacrilegious hand. Our ancestors 
were great innovators; and had ihey net been so, 
the darkness and the despotism which existed a 
thousand years ago would have continued until 
the present moment. For my own part, I believe 
that the human race, from generation to genera- 
tion, hits in the main been advancing, and will con- 
tinue So advance, in wisdom and knowledge; and 
whenever experience shall demonstrate th&t a 
change, even in the Federal Constitution, will pro- 
mote the happiness and pio?periiy of the people, I 
shall not hrsilate to vote in favor of such a 
change. Sti 1, there are circumstances which 
surround this instrument with peculiar sane- 
tity. It W.1S framed by cs wise men and as 
pure patriots a« the sun of heaven ever shone 
upon. We have every reason to belifve that 
Providence Jmiled upon their labors, and predes- 
tined them to bless mankind. Iramedia:ely after 
the adoption of the Constitution, order arose out 
of confusion; and a settled Government, capable 
of performing all its duties to its constituents with 
energy snd effect, succeeded lo the chaos and dis- 
order wbi.ih h.'.d previously existed under the Ar- 
ticles of Confederation. For more than half a 
century, under this Constitution, we have enjoyed 
a greater degree of liberty and happiness than has 
ever fallen to the lot of any other nation on earth. 
Under such circumstances, the Senator from Ken- 
tucky, before be can rightfully demand our votes 
in favor of a radical change of this Constitution, 
in one of its fundamental articles, ought to 
make out a clear case. He ought not only to point 
out the evils which the country has suffered from 
the existence of the veto power, but ought to con- 
vince «s, they have been of such mEgnitude, that 
it is not better "to bear the ills we lave, than fly 
to others that we kiiow not of." For my own 
part, 1 believe ttiat tie veto power is one of the 
strongest aud stateliest columns of that fair temple 
which our ancestors have dedicated to liberty; and 
that if you remove it from this liine-hcnored edi- 
fice, you will essentially if.pair its strecgih and 
mar its beauty. Indeea tneie wiii then be great 
danger that in time it may tumble into ruins. 

S:r, in regurd to this ve'-.o power, as it at present 
exists, the convention which franked the Constitu- 
tion, although much divided on other subjects, 
were unanimous. It is true that in the eai'lier 
s'ages of (heir proceeding?, it was considerably 
discjs.-ed, and presented in different aspects. 'Some 
members were in favor of an absolute veto, and 
others were opposed to any veto, however qua'ified; 
but they at length nnanimou'ly adopted the happy 
mean, and framed the article as it now stands in 
the Consiitution. According to Mr. Madiscn'^ re- 
port of the debates and proceedings in the conven- 
tion, we fi.'id t; at on Saturday the 21st July, .t787, 
'the ieif.h resolution giving the Executive a quali- 
fied veto, requiring two thirds of each branch of 
th^ Legislature to overrule it, was then ag:eed to 
nem con." The convention cominued in se.ssiQn for 
nearly two months after this deci&ion; but so far as 
I can discover, no member ever attempted to dis- 
turb this unanimous decision. 

A principle thus settled ought never to be rashly 
assailed under the excitemeni of disappointed feel- 



ings occasioned by the veto of two faverile mea- 
sures at the extra session, on which Senators had 
fixed their hearts. There ought to have been lime 
for pas&ion to cool and reason to resume her em- 
pire. I know very well that the Senator from Ken- 
tucky had announced his opposition to the veto 
power so far back as June, 1840, in his Hanover 
speech; bui that speech may I'airiy be considered 
as adeclaraiion of his own individual opinion on 
thissubject. The great Whig parly never adopted 
it as one of Ihe cardinal articles of uieir faiih, uniil, 
smarting under di^-appointvnent, ihay saw ih?ir 
two favorite measures of the extra ?-essicn fall be- 
neath ihis power. It was then, and not till then, 
that the resolution, in effect, to abolish it was 
adopted by them sis a party, in tbeir mat)ife.*to. 
The, present amendment proposes to carry this re- 
solution inio execuiion. 

I should rather rely upon the- judgment of the Se- 
nator from Kentucky on any other question', thau 
in regard to ihe veto power. He has suf- 
fered so much from va exercise as to rencer 
it almost impossible that he can be an impar- 
tial judge. History will record the lorg and 
memorable struggle between himself ond a dis- 
tinguished ex-President, now in retirement. 
Tbis was no common party strife. Their mighty 
war shook the whole Republic to its centre. Tiie 
one swayed the majority in both Houses of Con- 
gress; whilst the other was surtaincd by a majority 
of the people. Under the lead of (he one, Con- 
gress passed bills to establish a Bank of the United 
States; — to comm^nceasjstem of i::ternal improve- 
ments: — and to distribute the proceeds; of the public 
lands among the several States; whilst the other, 
strong in his conviction^: ol diiiy, ind strong in bis 
belief that the voicn^ of the sovereign people would 
condemn ihese measures of their representative?, 
vetoed them everyone. And what was the re?ult? 
Without, upon ibe present <scca=;ion, expressing an 
'Opnion oii any one of these questions, was it not 
rendered manifest that the President elected by the 
mass ol the people, and directly le-ponsible to them 
for his conduct, understood iheir will and their 
wishes better than the majority in the Senate and 
House of Reprejentatives-? No wonder then thst 
the Senator from Kentucky should detCot Ihe veto 
power. It ought never to be torn from its lounda- 
tions in the Constitution by the rash hands of a po 
litical party, impelled to the deed under the influ- 
ence of defeated hopes and disappointed aaibition. 

I trust now that I shall be able to prove that the 
Senat'or from Kentucky has entirely mistaken the 
character of the veto power; that in its origin and 
nature it is peculiarly democratic; that in the 
qualified form in which it exist; in cur Constitu- 
tion, it is but a mere appeal by the President of 
the people's choice from the decision of Corgress 
to the people themselves; and that whil-t the exer- 
cise of this power has done much good, it never 
has been, and never can be, dargerous to the 
rights and liberties of the people. 

This is not ," an arbi'rary and monarchical 
power;" it is not "a monarchical prerogative," as 
It has been designated by the Senator. If it v/ere, 
I should go with him, heart and hand, for its aboli- 
tion. What is a monarchical prerogative? It is a 
power vested in an Emperor or King, neither elect- 



ed by, nor responsible to, the people, to maintain 
and preserve the privileges of his throne. The ve- 
to power in the hands of duch a sovereign has 
nevr been exerted, and will never be exerted, except 
io arrest the progress of popular liberty, or vrhat he 
niHy lerm popular encroachment. It is the cha- 
racter of the public agent on whom this power is 
conferred, and not the nature of the power itself, 
which, stamps it either as democratic or arbitrary. 
In its origin, we all knov/ that it was purely demo- 
cratic. It owes its existence to a revolt of the peo- 
ple of Rome r>?ainst the tyrannical decrees of the 
Ssnaie. They retired from the city to the Sacred 
Mount, and demanded the right- of freemen. They 
thus extorted from the aristocratic Senate a decree 
auihorizirg them annually to elect tribunes of the 
[leople. Oa these tribunes was conferred the 
power of annulling any decree of the S-nate, by 
dimply pronouncing the word " refo." Tr is very 
power was the only one by mi-ans of waich the 
Democracy of Rome exercised any control over 
the Government of the Republic. It was their only 
safeguard against the oppression and cncroach- 
ment.T of the aristocracy. It is true that it did not 
enable the people, through Iheir tribunes, to origi- 
nate laws; but it saved them from all lav^s of the 
Senate which encroached on their rights and liber- 
ties. 

Now, sir, let me ask the Senator from Kentucky, 
Was tkis an arbitrary and monarchical power? No, 
sir; it was strictly democratic. And why? Be- 
cause It was exercised by tribunes elected by the 
people, and responsible annually to the people; and 
I shall now attempt to piove that the tret j power, 
under our Constitution, ii; of a timilar charscter. 

Who is ths President of the United Slates, by 
whom this power is to be exercised? He is a citizen, 
elected by his fellow citizens to Ibe highest official 
trust in the country, and directly responsible to ihena 
for the manner in which he ihall discharge his du- 
ties. From the manner in which he is elected, be 
more nearly represents a majority of the whole peo- 
rle of the IJniied Slate- than auy otLer biar ch of the 
Goveratnent. Sir, one-fourth of the people may elect 
a decided majority of the Senate. Under the Con- 
stitution, we are the representatives of sovereign 
States, and liule Delaware has an equal voice in 
this body with the Empire State. How is it in re- 
gard to the House of Repiesentatives? Without a 
revort to the gerrymandering process which of late 
years ha^ become so cimmon, it may often hap- 
pen, from the arrangement of the Congres'^ionaL 
districts, that a minority of the people of a >AMe 
will elect a majority of representatives to Con- 
gress. Not so in regard lo the President of the 
United S'ates. From necessity, he must be elect- 
ed by the mai-s of the people in the several States. 
He is the creature o{ the people— the mere breath 
of their nostrils — and on him, as the tribune of the 
people, have they conferred the veto power. ' 

Is thpr? anf serious danger that suc'i a magis-- 
trate will ever abuse this powe.? Wh?t earthly 
inducement can he have to pursue such a course? 
In ihe first place, during his fir:-i term, ha will ne- 
cessarily feel anxious to obtain the stamp of pub- 
lic approbation on bis conduct, by a re election. 
For this reason, if no other existed, he will not ar- 
ray himself^ by the exercise of the veto power 



against a majorily in both Houses of Congres?, un- 
less in extreme cases, where, from strong convic- 
lions of public duty, he may be willing to draw down 
upon himself their hostile influence. 

In the second place, the Constitution leaves him 
in a state of dependence on Congress. Without 
their support, no me&sure recommendeJ by him 
can become a law, an \ no system of policy which 
he may have devised can be carried into execution. 
Deprived of their aid, he can do nothing. Upon 
their cordial co-operation the success and glrry ol 
his administration must, in a great degree, depend. 
Is it, then, at all probable that he would make war 
upon Congress, by refusing to sanction any one of 
their favorite measures, unless he felt deeply con- 
scious that he was acting in obedience to the will 
of the people, and could appeal to them for sup- 
poff? Nothing short of such a convicion, unless 
it be to preserve his oath inviolate to support the 
Constitution, will ever induce him to exercise a 
power always odious in the e^es of ihe majority in 
Congress, against which it is exerted. 

But there is still ano.her powerful influence 
■which will prevent his abase of the veto power 
The man who has been elevated by his fel- 
low-citiz?ns to the highest office of trust and 
dignity which a great nation can bestow, musi 
necess'-rily feel a strong desire to have his name 
recorded in untarnished characters on the pase 
of his country's history, and to live after death in 
the hearts of bis countrymen. This consideration 
would forbid the abuse of the veto power. What 
is posthumous fame in almort every instance ? Is 
it not the voice of posterity reechoing the opinion 
of the present generation? And what body on the 
earth can give so powerful an impulse to public 
opinion, at least in this country, as th'? Cone;ress ol 
the United States ? Under all these circumsiances, 
we must admit that the opinion expressed by the 
Federalisi is sound, ar.d that "it is evidcni that 
there would be greater danger of his not using hi-^ 
power when i-iccessary, ihan tf ^i s using it too often 
or too much " Such must also have been Mr. Jef- 
ferson'i' opinion. Wh^n coasulied by Gencal 
Washiag'on in April, 1792, as to ihe propriety of 
vetoing "ihe act for an apportiotiment of R^pre- 
j-entalives among ihe seveial Stales, according to 
the first enumera'-ion," what was his first reason in 
favor of the exercise of this power upon that occaJinn? 
"Viewing the bill," says he, '-either as a violaticn 
of the. Constitution, or as giving an inconvenient 
exposition to its words, is it a case wherein ihe Pie- 
sident ought to interpose bis negative?" "I think 
it is." "TAe non uslt of his negative power begins 
already to txcite a belief that no President will ever 
venture to use il; and consequently, has begotten a de- 
sire to raise up barriers in the Slate Legislatures 
against Congress throwing off the conlrcl of the Con 
stitxdion.'''' I shall not read the oher rea-^ions he 
has assigned, none of them being necessary for my 
present purpose. Perilous, indeed, I repeat, is the 
exercise of the veto power, and "no President will 
ever venture to use it," uh'ess from the strongest 
sense of duty, and the strongest conviction that it 
"Will receive the public appn bation. 

But, after all, what is the nature of this qualified 
veto under the Constitution ? It is,'in fact, but an 
appeal taken by the President from the decision of 



Congress, in a particular case, to the tribunal of 
the sovereign people of the several States, who are 
equally the masters of boih. If they decide against 
the President, their decision must finally prevail, by 
the admission of the Senator himself. The same 
President must either carry it into execution him- 
self, or the next President whom tht-y elect will do 
so. The veto never can do more than postpone 
legislative action on the measure of which it i« the 
subject, until the will of the people can be fairly 
expressed. This suspension of action, if the peo- 
ple should not sustain the President, will noi gene- 
rally continue longer than two years, audit cannot 
continue longer than four. If the people, at the 
next eiecions, should return a majority to Congress 
hostile to the vsto, and the same measure should 
be passed a second lime, he must indeed be a bold 
man, and intent upon his own destruction, who 
wfuld, a second time, arrest il by his veto. After 
the popular voice has determined the, question, 
the President would always submit, unless, by so 
doing, he clearly believed he would involve himself 
m the guilt of perjury, by violating his oath to sup- 
port the Constitution. At the end of four years, 
however, in any and every event, the popular will 
must and would be obeyed by the election of 
another President. 



Sir, the Senator from Kentucky, in-one of ihose 
beautiful passages which always abound in his 
speeches, hai drawn a glowing picture of the iso- 
lated condition of kings, v;hose ears the voice of 
public opinion is never permitted to reach ; and he 
has compared their condition \n this particular, 
with ihat of the President of the United States. 
Plere too, he said, the Chief Magistrate occupied 
an isolated station, where the voice of bi.^ country 
and the cries of its distress could not reach his ear. 
But is there any justice in this comparison? Such 
a picture may be true to the life when drawn for 
an European monarch; but it has no application 
whaever to a President of ihe United States. He, 
sir, is no mcire thsn the first citizen of this free Re- 
public. No form is required in approaching his 
person, wh ch can prevent the humblest of his fel- 
low-citizens from communicating with hini. In 
approaching him, a freeman of this land is not 
compelled to detxrale himself in fantastic robes, or 
adept any psri!eul?,r form of dress, .'^uch as the 
court etiquette of Europe require.'. The President 
intermingles freely with his fellow-ciiiaens, and 
nears the opinions of all. The public pre.ss attacks 
him — political parties, in and ouiof Congress,assaii 
him, End the thunders of the Syjalor's o^, n denuncia- 
tory eloquence are reverberated from the Capitol, 
and reach the White Houjc before its incumhent 
can lav hi-- head upcn his pillow. His every act 
issubjectfd to the st-vcrest scrutiny, and he reads 
in the newspapers of the day the decrees of public 
opinion. Indeed it is the privilege of every body 
to assail him. To contend that such a Chief Ma- 
gistrate i.s isolated from the people, is to base aa 
argument upon mer" fancy, and not upon facts. 
No, sir; the Presiflent of the'United States is more 
directly before the people, and more immediately 
responsible to the people, than any other department 
of our Government: and wo be to that President 
who sha 1 ever affect to withdraw from the public 



13 



have been in bad taste; bat what do they provt? 
The Senator does not and cannot say that they ever 
changed a single vote. In the instances to which 
he refers, they were the declaration of a fact which 
was known, or might have been known, to the 
whole world. A President can only be elected by 
a majority of the people of the several States. 
Throughout the canvas*, his opinions and senti- 
ments un every leading naeasure of public policy, 
are known and discussed. The last election was 
an exception to this rule; but another like it will 
never again occur in our day. If, under such cir- 
cumstances, an act should pass Congress, notori 
ously iti viola'ionof some principle of vital im- 
portance, which was decided b^ tbe people at his 
election, the President would be faithless to the duty 
which he owed both to them ?nd to himself, if he 
did not disapprove the measure. Any person 
might then declare, in advance, that the President 
would veto such a bill. Let me imagine one or 
two cases which may readily occur. Is it not 
known from one end of the Union to tbe other, 
and even in every log cabin throughout it* extent, 
that the Senator fromi IVIissouri [Mr. Benton] has 
an uncouquerable antipathy to a paper currency, 
and an equally unconquerable predilection for hard 
money? Now, if he should be a candidate for the 
Presidency, — and much more unlikely events have 
happened than that he should be a successful can- 
didate — would not his election be conclusive evi- 
dence that the people were in favor of gold and 
silver, and against papeil Under such circum- 
stances, what else could Congress anticipate whilst 
concocting an old fashioned Bank of the United 
States, but that he would instantly veto the bill ©n 
the day it was presented to him, without even 
takicg time to sit down in his Presidential chair? 
(Great laughter, in which Mr. Benton and Mr. 

" -Clay both joined heartily.) Let me present a re- 
verse case. Suppose the distmguishcd Senator 
from Kentucky should'be elected President, would 

,iie hesitate, or, with his opinions, ought he to hesi- 
tate, a moment in vetoipg an Independent Treasu- 
ry bill, jhonid Cosgress present him such a mea- 
surt? And if I, as a member of the Senate, were 
to assert, in ths first case which I have supposed, 
whilst the bank bill was pending, that it would 

-most certainly be vetoed, to n^hat would this 
amount? Would it be an attempt to bring Ex- 
ecutive influence to bear on Congress? Certainly 
not. It would only be the mere assertion of a 
well known fact. Would it prove any thing 
against the veto power? Certainly not; but direct- 
ly the reverse. It would prove that it f ught to be 
exercised — 'hat the people had wil'ed, by the Pre- 
sidential election, that it shoul-l be exercised — and 
that it was one of the very cases which demanded 
its exercise. 

An anucipation of the exercise of the veto 
power, in cases which had already been decided by 
the people, ought to exercise a restraining influence 
over Congress. It should admonish them that 
they ought not to place tiisinselves in hostile array 
against the Executive, and thus emb.irrass the ad- 
ministration of the Government by the adoption 
of a measure which had been previously condemn- 
ed by the people. If the measure be right in itself, 
the people will, at the subseqent elections, reverse 
their own decision, and then, aud not till then, 



ought Congress to act. No, sir; when we- elect &■' 
President, we do it in view of his future course of" 
action, inferred from his known opinions; and we 
calculate, with great accuracy, what he will and 
what he will not do. The people have never yet 
been deceived in relation to this matter, as has 
been abundantly shown by their approbation of 
every important veto since the origin of the Go- 
vernment. 

This veto power was conferred upon the Presi- 
dent to arrest unconstitutional, improvident, and 
hasty legislation. Its intention (if I may use a 
word not much according to my taste) was purely 
conservative. To adopt the language of the Fede- 
ralist, "it establishes a salutary check upon the le- 
gislative bodr, calculated to guard the community 
against the efl^ecls of faction, precipitancy, or of 
any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which 
may happen to itsfluence a majority of that body," 
[Congress.] Throughout the whole book, when- 
ever the occasion offers, a feeling of dread is ex- 
pressed, lest the legislative power might transcend 
tbe limits prescribed to it by the Constitution, and 
ultimately absorb the other powers of the Govern- 
ment. From first to last, this fear is manifested. 
We ought never to forget that the representatives 
of the peop)'» are not the people themselves. The- 
practical neglect of this distinction has often led 
to the overthrow of Republican institutions. Eter- 
nal vigilance is the price of liberty; and the people 
should regard with a jealous eye, not only their 
Executive, but their legislative servants. The re- 
presentative feody, proceeding from the people, and 
clothed with their confidence, naturally lulls suspi- • 
cion to sleep; and, when disposed to betray its 
trust, can execute its purpose almost before their 
constituents take the alavm. 

It must have been well founded apprehensions- 
of such a result which induced Mirabeau to declare, 
that, without a veto power in the king, who was no 
more, under the first Constitution of France, thaa 
the hereditary chief executive magitfrateof a Re- 
public, he would rather live in Constantinople than 
in Pafis. The catastrophe proved his wisdom; 
but it also proved that the veto was no barrier 
against the encroachments of the Legislative As- 
sembly; nor would it have saved his own head from 
the block, bad he not died at the most propitious 
moment for his fame. 

I might appeal to many passages in the history 
of the world to prove that the natural tendency of 
legislative power has al^rays been to increase it- 
self; and the accumulation of this power has, ia 
many instances, overthrown Republican iuslila- 
lions. 

Our system of representative Democracy, Hea- 
ven's last and best political gift to man, when per- 
verted from its destined purpose, has become the 
instrument of the most cruel tyranny which the 
world has ever vitnessed. Thus it is that the best 
things, when perverted, become the worst. Wit- 
ness the scenes of anarchy, confusion, and blood, 
from which huma|^ty and reason equally revoir, 
which attended the French revolution, du ing the 
period of the Legislative Assembly and National 
Convention. So dreadful were these scenes, all 
enacted in the name of the people, and by the peo- 
ple's own representatives, that they stand out ia 
bold relief, from all the records of time, and are. 



14 



by the universal consent of mankind, denominated 
"tbe reign of terror." Underthe government of ihe 
Committee of Public Safety — a commitiee of the 
National Convention — more blood v as shed and 
more atrocities committed, than mankind had ever 
beheld within the same space of time. And yet ali 
this was doiie in the name of liberty and equaliiy. 
And what was Ihe result? All this only paved ihe way 
for the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte; and the 
people sought protection in the arms of despotism 
from the ryranny and corruption of their own re 
presentalives. This has ever been the course in 
which Republics have degenersteu mto military 
despotisms. L?t these sacred truths be ever kept 
in mind: that sovereignty belongs to the people 
alone, and that all their servants should he 'vaiched 
with the eyes of sleepless jealousy. The Legisla- 
tive As.-emb!y and the National Convention ol 
France hf^d usurped all the powers of the Govern- 
ment. Tftey each, iii their turn, constituted the 
sole representative body of ibe nation, and no wise 
checks and barritra were in'erposed to moderate and 
restrain their iictioa. The example which they pre- 
32nied has con virced all mankind of the necessity ol 
a Senate in a Republic; and similar reasons ought to 
convince them of ihe necessity of such a qualified 
veto j;s exists uncer our Ccnstituiion. The people 
cannot interpose too many barriers against un- 
wii^e and wicked legislatios, provided they do not 
thereby impair the necessary powers of the Gc- 
veinmeDt. I know full v.'ell that saco scenes as 1 
have just described cannot occur in America; but 
stili we may learn lessons of wisdom from thtm to 
guide our own conduct. 

Legislative bodies of any considerable nUiriber 
are mere liable to sudden and violent excitements 
than individuals. This we have all often witness- 
ed; and it results from a well known pricciple of 
human nature. In the midst of such excitement*, 
Kothiiig is more uatura! ihan hasty, rash, and dan- 
gerous iegi.sleaion. Individual responsibility is, 
also, iiimin;.-hed. in proportion to the increase ol 
the number. Each peison, constituting but a 
small fractional part of the whole mass,, thinks he 
can escape re.^ponsibiiity in the midst of the crowd. 
The restraint of the popular will upon his conduct 
is thus greatly diminished, and as one of a number 
he is ready to perform acts which he would not at- 
tempt upon his own individual responsibility. In 
order to check such excesses, the Federalist tells us 
that ihis veto power, or reference of the subject lo 
the people, was granted. 

Again, sir, highly excited political parties may 
exist in legislative assemblies, so intent upon grasp- 
ing or retaiiiing power, that in the struggle they 
will forget tLe wishes and the interests of the peo- 
ple. I m'ght cite several examples of this kind in 
the h'sory of our own legislation; but I merely 
refer to lbs odious and unconstitutional alien and 
sedition lawi. hud on by ambitious and eloquent 
men « ho have become highly excited in the en- 
test, li.e triumph of party may become paramount 
to ilio good cf the countrv. and unconstitutional 
-and dangerous laws may m the consequence. The 
veto power is necessary to arrest such encroach- 
ments en the righls of the States and of the people. 

But worst of all is the system of "I yg-r oiling," 
BO prevalent in Congress and tbs State Legisla- 
tures, which the authors of the Federalist do not 



seem to have foreseen. This is not a namg, to be 
snre, for ears polite; yet, though homely, it is so 
i-ignificant of the thing, that I shall be pardoned for 
its u^e. Now, sir, this very system of log-rolling 
in legislative bodies is that which has involved 
several of the States in debts for internal improve- 
ments, which I fear some of them may never be 
able to pay. In order to carry improvements 
which were useful and uJght have been produc- 
tive, it was necessary to attach to them works of 
an oppcsite character. To obtain money to meet 
these extravagant expenditures, indulgence was 
granted to the banks at the expense of the people, 
fnd^.^d it has been a fruitful source of that whole 
syMtm of ruinous and disastrous measures against 
which the Detrocracy have be^n warring for years. 
It hss produced more distress in the country than 
can be repaired by industry and economy for many 
days to come. And yet how rarely has any Execu- 
tive had the courage to apply the remedy which 
the veto powrer presents? 

Let us, for a moment, examine the workings of 
thifi system. It is the more dangerous, bfcau^e it 
presents itself lo individual member.*; under the garb 
of devotion to their constituents. One has a mea- 
sure of mere local advantage to carry, which ought, 
ifatall, tobe accomplished by individual enter- 
prL-^e, and which could not pass if it stood alone. 
He finds that he cannot accomplish his object, if 
he relies only upon it* merits. He finds thatoher 
member* have o'her local objects at heart, none of 
which would receive the support of a majority it 
separately consideied. These members, then, form 
a combination suffirienlly powerful to carry the 
whole; and thus twenty measures may be adopted, 
not one of which separately could have obtained a 
respectable vote. Thanks to the wisdom and en- 
er?.y of Genera! Jacks.cri, this system of Icc^l inter- 
nal improvemtnts which threatened to extend it- 
self into every neighborhood of the nation, and 
overspread the land, was arrested b" Ibe veto pow- 
er. Hai not this been done, the General Govern- 
ment might, at ihe present day, have been in .-the 
same vvretched condition with the most indebted 
States. 

Bat ihis system of •'log-roliing"has not been con- 
fined to mere local affairs, as ihe history of the ex- 
tra session will testify. It was then adopted in re- 
gard to important party objects, and was called the 
"great system of measures of the Whig party." It 
was openly avowed (hat the majority must take 
the system in majs, alihough it is weil known that 
several of the measures, had they stood alone, 
would have been rejected in detail. We are all 
perfectly aware that this was the vital principle of 
the extra session. By means of "log-rolling" ihe 
sys'em was adopted. That the passage of the Dis- 
tribution hill v;as the price paid for the Bankrupt 
bill, was openly avowed on this floor. By what 
mutual compensationv the other measures were car- 
ried we are left to infer, and therefore 1 shall not 
bF.zird the expression of any opinion in this place , 
on the subject. The ingredient, which one member 
couid not swallow alone, went down ea'aly as a 
component part of the healing dose. And what has 
been the consequence? The extravagant appro- 
priations and enormous expenses of the extra ses- 
sion have beggared the Treasury. 

It is to check this system, that the veto power 



\^ 



eye, and seclude himself in the recesses of the Ex- 
ecutive mansion! 

The Senator has said, and with truth', that no 
veto of ^he President hcs ever been overruled, 
i^ince the origin of the Government. Not one. 
Although he introduced Ihi.s fsci Jor another pur- 
pose than that which now induces me to advert to 
it, yet ii is not the less true en that account, Ls 
not this the strongest possible armament to prove 
that there never yet has been a veto, in violation 
of the public will? 

[Here Mr. Clay observed that ihere bad been 
repeated in^iances of majorities in Congress decid- 
ing against vetoes] 

Mr. BocHANAN re$urai'd. I sm now speaking 
of majoriiies, not of Congress, but vf the people. 
i shall speak of Hiajorities in Conijress presen'lv. 

Why, iir, has no veto b^en ever overruleo? 
Simply beciUise thePre.sident has never exercised, 
and never will exercise this perilous power on any 
important occasion, unle5.s firmly convinced that 
he is right, and tha^he will bs sii^tamed by the 
people. Standirg alone, u'iih ih'? whole re.<:pon 
sibility of his high officialdutie; pre sssngupon him, 
he will never br.ive the enorrnou.s power and influ- 
ence of Ci ngress, unlets he feels a ncoral cer- 
tain-y tbai tba people will f,orT.e,to the rescue. 
When he ventures lo differ from C.nsrcss, and ap 
peal iiube people, the chances are all agaiosc him. 
The members of the Senaie and iba House are 
numerous, and are scattered over Ire wVioIe coun- 
iry, whiht the President is but an individual confined 
to the oily ofWashington. TiieirpeLsonal influence 
withih«-irconstiiuentsis,and must be,gr?at. In such 
a strnggif, he must mainly rely upon the palpable 
justice of his cause. Urider these circuraslancss, 
dots it not speak volumes in favor of the discre- 
tion with which the veto power has been exercised, 
that it has never once been overruled/ in a single 
instance, since the origin of Var Government, 
either by. a majority of the people in (he several 
States, or by the constitutional majority la Con- 
gress? 

It is truly astonishing how rarely this power has 
ever been exercised. During the pariod of more 
than half a C'-jntury which has elapsed since the 
meeting of the first Congre-^s under the Con'ititu- 
tion, about six ihousand legislative acts have be«n 
passed. How m?iny of these, sir, do you suppose 
have been dis^ipproved by the Piendeni?' Twenty, 
sir; twenty is the whole number. I speak 
from a Hst now in my hand prepared by one 
of the felerks of the Senate. And this number 
embraces not merely tho.-e hills which have been 
actually ve.oed; but all such as were retained by 
him under the Constitution, in consequence of hav- 
ing been presented at so late a period of the ses- 
sion that he could not prepare his objections pre- 
vious to the adjournment. Twenty is the ?um 
total of all ! 

Let us anal}ze these, vetoes, (fori shall call 
them ail by that name,) for a few momeots. Of the 
twep.ty, eight were on bills of small comparative 
importance, and excited no public attention. Con- 
gress at once yielded to the President's objections, 
and in one remarkable instance, a veto of General 
Jackson was !?_;d upon the table on the motion of 
the Senator froni Kentucky himself. No attempt 



was even made to pass the bill in oppositio n to- 
this veto, and no one Senator contested its pro- 
priety. Eleven of the twelve remaing vetoes upon 
this list, relate to only three subjects. These are, a 
Bank of the United States; internal improvements ' 
fn diffeient forms; and the distribution of the pro- 
eeeds of the public lands among the several States, 
Th:re have been four vetoes of a Bank of the 
United States; one by Mr Madison, one by Gene- 
ral Jackson, and two by Mr. Tyler. There have 
been six vetoes on internal improvements, in dif- 
ferent forms; one by Mr. Msdison, one by Mr, 
Monroe, and four by General Jackson. And Ge- 
neral Jackson vetoed the bill to distribute the pro- 
ceeds of the sales of the public lands among the 
Si veial States. These make the eleven. 

The reuiaining veto was by General Wa^-hing- 
inston; and it is remarkable that it should be the 
most questionable exercise of this power which, 
has ever occurred. I refer to his second and last 
veto, en the first of March, 1797, and bet three 
days before he retired from office, on the "Act 
10 alter and amend an act, eniitled an act to ascer- 
lain sod fix the military establishment of the 
United States." In ihis instaiice, there was a ma- 
jority of neiirly two-third* in the House of Repre- 
sentatives, where it originated, in favor of passing 
ihe act, notwith-t.5ndiiig the objections of the 
Father of his Country. Tlae vote was lifiy-five ia 
the affirmative lo ihiiiy-sii' in the negative. This: 
act provided for the reduclicn r.f the military esta- 
blishment of the country; and the day will proba- 
bly never asain arrive when any President will 
venture to veto an act reducing the standirg army 
of the United States. 

Then in tho range of time since the year 1789, 
there have been but twenty vetoes; and eleven of 
these related to only three' subjects which have ra- 
dicsliy divided the tws great political parties of the 
cf>untry. With the exception of twenty, ail the 
acts which have -ever passed Congress, have besea 
allowed to take their course without any Executive 
interference. 

Thst this power has never been abtssel, is as 
clear as the light of the sun. I a^k Senators, and 
I appeal to you, sir, whether the American people 
have not sanctioned every one of the vetoes oil 
the three £reat subj^.c's to whirh I have referred. 
Ye?, sir, everv one, not excepting those on the Fis- 
cal Bank and Fiscal Corporation— the leading mea- 
sures of the ei-tra session- Notwithstanding the 
solemn denunciation asainst the President, made 
by the V/hig party, and their appeal to the people, 
I ibe.-e has been no election held since that session ia 
which the people have not declared, in a voice of 
thunder, ibeir approbation of the two vetoes of 
! President Tyler. I shall not, upon the present oc- 
casion, di!<cuss the question whether all or any of 
t'hese vetce* were right or wrong. I merely state 
he incontrovertible fact that they have all been 
ap'^roved by the AcJerican people. 

The character of the bills vetoed shows conclu- 
sively the striking contrast between the veto power 
when entrusted to an elective and responsible 
Chief Magistrate, and when conferred upon a 
European sovereign as a royal prerogative. All the 
vetoes which an American President ha^s imposed 
on any important act of Congress, except the one 



by General Washington, to which I have alluded, 
have been so many instances of self-denial. These 
acts have all been returned, accompanied by mes- 
sages remonstrating against the extension of Exe- 
cutive power, which they proposed to grant. Ex- 
erting the influence which these acs proposed to 
confer upoa him, the President might, indeed, have 
made long strides towards the attainment of mo- 
narchical power. Had a National Bank been es- 
tablished under his control, uniting the moneyed 
"with the political power of the caantry; — 
had a splendid system of internal improvements 
been adopted and placed under his direction, pre- 
senting prospects of pecuniary advantage to almost 
every individual throughout the land; and in addi- 
tion to all this, had the States become pensioners 
on the bounty of the Federal Government for the 
amount of the proceeds of the sales of the public. 
lands, we might soon have witnessed a powerful 
coMsoJidated Government, with a chief at its head 
far different from the plain and unpretending Pre- 
sident recognised by the Constitution. The Gene- 
ral Government might then have become every 
thing, whilst the State Governments v/ould have 
sunk to noshing. Thanks to the vetoes of our Pre 
sidents, and not to Congress, that most of these 
evils have' been averted. Had these acts been all 
approved by the President, it is my firm conviction 
that the Senator himself would as deeply have de- 
plored the consequences as any other true patriot, 
and that he would forever have regretted his own 
agency in substantially changing the form of our 
Government. Had these bills become laws, th^ 
Executive power would then have strode over all 
the other powers of the Constitution; and then, in- 
deed, the Senator might have justly compared the 
President of the United States with the 'monarchs 
of Europe. Our Presidents have had th? self-deny- 
ing firmness to render all these at'f^mpts abor'ivr 
to bestow on themselves extraoYdinary powers, 
and have been content to confine lhem?elves to 
those powess conferred on them by the Con- titu- 
tion. They have protected the rights o: the Stales 
and cf the people from the UDconstiturional mean«. 
of inflaence which Congrers had placed wiih n 
their grasp. Such have been the coDsequences of 
the ve'o po'^^er in the hands of our clectivs chief 
magistrate. 

For what purposes has this power been exerted 
by European monarchs with whom our President 
has been compared? When exei-cised ut all, it has 
alway-s been for the purpose of m-iintaining the 
royal prerogative and arres'ing the march of popu- 
lar liberty. There have been but f.vo^instKnces of 
its exercise in England since the Revolution of 
1683. Tne first was in 1692, by William the 
Third, the rival of Louis the Fourteenth, and be 
yond question the ablest man who has sal upon the 
throne of Great Britain for the last century and a 
half. He had the hardihood to veto the Earl 
of Shrewsbury's bill, which had passed buih 
Houses, limiting the duration of Parlia- 
ments to three, instead of seven year?;, 
and rfquiring annual sessions to te held. He 
dreaded the influence which members of the House 
of Commons, responsible to their constituents at 
the end of each period of three years, might exert 
against his royal power and prerogatives; and, 



therefore, held on by means of the veto to septen- 
nial Parliaments. And what did George the- 
Third dtl In 1806, he vetoed the Catholic Eman- 
cipation bill, and thus continued to hold in politi- 
cal bondage millions of his fellow men, because 
they insisted upoa worshipping their God accord-- 
ing to the dictates of tbeir own conscience. 

[Here Mr. Clav observed that this wa*: a mis- 
take, and expressed his belief that upon the occa- 
sion alluded to, the matter had gone no further 
'han the resignation ef the Grenville administra- 
tion.] 

Mr. BucHANA-^. 1 shall ihes read my authority, 
ft is to be found in '-Randoin Recollections of the 
House of Lord's, by Mr. Grant," page 25. The 
author says: 

"But if the King refuse his signature to it [a bill] as George 
I he Third did in the case of Ihe Catholic Emancipation bili 
o/ 1806, it necessarily falls to the grounJ. The way in which 
the King Intimates his determination not to give his assent to 
the measure, is not by a positive refusal in so many words; he 
simply observes, in answer to the application made to him for 
tliat purpose, 'Le Roi s'avisera,' namely, 'The King will con- 
sider of it,' which is un lerstoodto be a final deiermination not 
to sanction the measure.' 

Bat, sir, be this author correct or incorrect, as to 
the existence of a veto in 1806, it is a matter of 
trifling importance in the present aigumeni.* I ad- 
mit that ihe exercise of the veto powtr has fallen 
into disuse in England since the revt lution. And 
what are the reasonj? First, because its exercise 
by a hereditary sovereign to preserve unimpaired 
the prerogatives of the crown against the voice of 
the people, is always an odious exertion of ihe royal 
prerogative. It i<; far (.Afferent from its exerci?e 
by an elective magistrate, acting in the character 
of a tribune of the people, to preserve their rights 
■".nd liberties unimpaired. And secondly, becsuje 
this vetii power is no longer necessary to secure 
the prerogatives of the crown against the assaults 
of popular liberty. 

Two centuries ago, the people of England as- 
serted tbfir right* by ihf sword against their sove- 
reign. They dethtoned and beheaded him. Since 
that timf , the Kings ( f England have changed their 
course. Taey have dis-covered from ei;perience, 
that it was much easier to govern Parliament by 
means of the patronage and money at the com- 
mand of the crown, than openly to resi-t it by the 
veto power. Tnisiystem has succeed-d admirably. 
Influence has taken the place of prerogative; and 
since the days of Walpole, when the votes of mem- 
bers v/ere purchas.3d almost without disguise, cor- 
ruption has nearly destroyed the independent ac- 
tion of Pariiam.'nt. It has now descended into the 
ranks of the peopl- and threaten-, destruction fo the 
in.siitutions of that countrv. In the rt-ce.it contest 
for pow;,r between ihe Whigs and the Tories, thei 
bargain and sale of ihe votes of the electcrs was 



'Mr. Buchanan cannot discover, after careful examination, 
tliat any Catholic Emancipation Bill was vetoed by George the 
Third in ISOtJ, according to the statement of Mr Giant. Tliat 
gentleman, most probalily, intended to refer to the bill for this 
purpose which was introduced by the Grenville ministry, in 
March, 1807, under the impression that they had obtained lor it 
the approbation of liis Majesty. Upon its second reading, no- 
tice was given of his displeasure. The ministry then agreed 
to drop the bill altogether; but, notwithstanding this concession, 
they were changed, because ihey would not give a written 
pledge to the Icing, that they should propose no farther conces- 
sions 10 the Catholics thereafter. This was an exertion of the 
royal'prerogative beyond the veto power. 



open and notorious. The bribeiy and ccrirupiion 
of both parties sought no di?guise. In maviy places 
the price ol a vote was fixed, like any oitier com- 
modi'y in the market. These things have been 
proclaimed wilhoui contradielion on ihe floor of 
Parliament. The Tories had the most money to 
expeud; and the cause of dear bread, with a starv- 
ing popuiauon, prevailed over the modification or 
repeal ot the corn laws. In a country so venal, it 
is easy for the crown, by a politic distribution of its 
honor.", clSces, and emoluments, and if these 
should all tail, by a direct application of money, 
to preserve its prerogatives without the use of the 
veto power. 

Besides, the principal ministers of the crown ars 
always members of ^lie Hoase of Loids.er the 
House of Commons. It is ihey who originate thx.' 
ituportani laws; and they, and they alone,' are re- 
sponsible, because it is a maxim of the British Go- 
vernment, that the King can do no wrong. If they 
cannot maintain a majority in Parliament by the 
use of the patronage and influence of the crown, 
they must yield their places to their successful ri- 
val?; and the King, wiihout the least hesitation, 
will recei'v-e as his confidential advisers torn >rrow, 
the very men vvhrse principks he had condemned 
bat yesterday. Such is a King of England. He 
cSin do no wrong. 

On one memorable occasion, when the ministers 
of the crown themselves—I refer to the coali'.ion 
-adminisiiaiion of Mr. Fox and Lord Nonh — had 
pasved th»ir East India Bill throu^zh ihe House of 
Comraoas, it was defeated in the House of Lords 
by Ihe direct personal .nfluetice of the sovereign. 
George the Third, it is known, would have vetoed 
that bill, had it passed the Heuse of Lords; and 
well he might. It was an attempt by hife own 
ministers to obtain possession of the wealth and 
the power of India, aod to u^e them for the purpose 
of controlling both the sovereign and the people cf 
England. This was not the common case of a 
mere struggle between opposiie parties as to which 
should administer the Goverament, about which 
the sovereign of England might be perfec'ly indif- 
ferent; but it was an attetript to deprive the crown 
of its power and prerogatives. 

Under such circumst.iuces, can the Senator se- 
riously contend that, because the veto power has 
been disused by the kings of England, there- 
fore, it ought to be takm from the Presideat of the 
United Stales? The King is a hereditary fnovereign 
— the. President^u elecive magistrate. The King 
is not respon.sibie to the people for theadminisira- 
tionof the Executive Government — the Pre.si;'em- 
is alone responsible. The King could feel no in- 
terest in using the veto power, except to maintain 
the prerogatives of the crown; and it has been 
shown to be wholly unnece.ssary for this purpo.5e; 
whilst ihe President has never exerted it on any 
imporlanc occai,ioo, but in obedience to the public 
will, and th^n only for the purpose of preventing 
encioachmcnls by Congress on the CoDstimdon of 
the country, on the righis of the States, and on Ihe 
liberties oi the people. 

The Senator is mista-ken in supposing that the 
veto power has never been exercised in France. It 
is true, I believe, that it has never been exerted by 
the Government of Louis Philippe; but bis Gevern- 



meni is as yet nothing but a mere experiment. It 
has now existed less ihan twelve years, and darinjf 
this short period there have been nineteen different 
cabinets. I saw a list of them a few days ago, in 
one of the public journals. To ciie the example 
of such a Government as authority here, is to 
prove that a Senator is hard ran f«r arguments. 
The unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, used the sus- 
pensive veto power conferred upon him by the first 
French Constitution, upon more than one occasion; 
but he used it not to enfo.-ce the will of the people 
a? our Presidents have done, but against public 
opinion, which >V5s at that lime omnipotent in 
France. The^e vetoes proved but a feeble barrier 
against ibe tremendous torrent of the Revolution, 
which was at that time overwhelming all the cor- 
rupt and tyrannical institutions of the ancient mo- 
narchy. 

TheSinator has referred to the Declaration of 
Independence, to show ih?.t Ihe exercise of this 
vpto power bv the King on the acts of the colonial 
Legislatures was one of the causes of the Hevolu- 
iicn. In that instrument h^ is charged with hav- 
inj; "refured his assent to laws the rros! w'^clcsome 
arTd necessary for t^e public good." In iho;e days 
a douceur was presented, in Pennsylvania, to the 
Proprieiary Governor, with every act of A -.embly 
in which the people felt a deep interest. I state this 
fiict on the authority of Dr. Franklin. After the act 
was approved by the Governor, it had then to be 
seat three ihousand miles across the Atlar-tic for 
ihe apprtbation of a hereditary sovereign, in no 
manner re.-^ponsibte to the people of this country. 
It tvouid have been stran£,e, indeed, had not this 
power been abused uader such circumstances. 
This was like the veto of Augus'us after he had 
usurped the liberties of the Roman people, and 
raade himself sole tribune— not like that of 
the iriliunes annually elected by Ihe Roman people. 
This was not the veto of James Madison, Andrew 
Jackson, or John Tyler— not the veto of a free- 
man, responsible to his fellow-freemen for the 
faithlui and honest exercise of his imprrtant 
'rust. Thi^ power is either democratic or arbitra- 
ry, as the authority exercLsing it may be dependent 
on the people or independent of them. 

But, sir, this veto power, which I humbly appre- 
h.-'ijd to be u.-.eful in every Sale Guvernojent, be- 
cnmes ab3olu.:ely necessary under the peculiar and 
complex form of the Federal Government. To this 
pci'it I desire especially to direct the attention of 
the Senate. The Federal Constitution was a work 
of mutual compromise and concession; and the 
States which became parties to it, must take the 
evil with the good. A majority of the people within 
each of the several States have the inherent right to 
c.knjre, modify, and amend their Constitu.ion at 
pleasure. Not so with respect to the Federal Con- 
stitution. In regard to it, a majority of the people 
of Ihe United Stales can exercise no such power. 
And tvhyl Simply because they have solemnly 
surrendered it, in consideraiioa of obtaining by this 
surrender all the blessings and benefits of our glori- 
ous Union. It requires two-thirds of the representa- 
tives of the States in the Senale, and two-thirds of 
ihf^ Representatives of the people in the House, 
even to propose an amendment to Ihe Constitution; 
and this must be ratified by three-fonrlhs of the 



8 



States before it can take effect. Even if twenly- 
fiveof the twenty-six States of which the Union is 
composed should determine to deprive "little Dela- 
ware" of her equal representation in the Senate,' 
she could defy them all, whilst this Consiiluiion 
shall endure. It declares that "ho State, without 
its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage 
in the Senate." 

As the Constitution could not have been adopted 
except by a majority of the people in every Siaie 
of the Union, the members of the convention be- 
lieved that it would be reasonable and just to re- 
quire that three-fourths of the States should concur 
in changing that which all had adopted, and to 
which ff^ had become parties. To give it a bind- 
ing force upon the conscience of every public func- 
tionary, each Senator and Representative, whether 
in Congress or the several Stale Legislatures, and 
every executive and judicial oflScer, whether State 
or Federal^is bound solemnly to swear or affirm that 
he will support tte Consiituuon. 

Now, sir, it has been said, and said truly by the 
Senator, that the will of the majority ought to pre 
vail. This is an axiom in the science of liberty 
which no'&oJy will at the present day dispute. Urder 
the Federal Constitution, this will must be declared in 
the manner which it has prescribed; and sooner or 
later, the m&jority must and will be obeyed in the 
enactment of laws. But what is this majority to 
wh'ch we are all bound to yiJd? Is it ihe xnajority 
of Senators and Representatives in Congress, or a 
majoriiy of the people themselves? The fallacy of 
the Senator's, argument, from beginning to end, 
consists in the assuojption that Congress, in every 
situation and under every circumstance, truly repre- 
sent the deliberate v;ill of ib.c people. The fraraers 
of the Constitu'.ioa believed it might be otherwise; 
and therefore they imposed the restriction of ihe 
qiialified veto of the President upon the legislative 
action of Congress. 

What is ihe most glorious and useful invention 
of modern time* in the s-cience of free Governmeni? 
Undoubtedly, wriiien Coniiituiions. For want of 
these, the ancient Republics were scenes of turbu- 
lence, violfiice and dii;nrder, and ended in &elf-de- 
strucnon. And whai are all our constitutions, bui 
restraints imposed, not by arbitrary authoritv, but 
by the people upon themselves and their own Repre- 
sentatives'? Such ihrcughout is the character of the 
Federal Constitution. And it is this Conslimtion. 
thus restricted, which h?!S so ling secured our li- 
berty and prosperity, and has endeared itself to the 
heart of every good citizen. 

This system of self-imposed restraints is a ne- 
cessary element of our :«ocial condition. Every 
wise and virtuous man adopts resolutions by which 
he regulates his conduct, for the purpose of coun 
teracting the evil propensities of his nature, and 
preventing him from yielding under the impulses 
of sudden and strong temp ation. Is :uch a man 
the less free — the less independent, because he 
chooses to submit to these self-imposed restraints? 
la like manner, is the majority of the people les« 
free and less irjdependcnt, because it has chosen to 
impose constitutional restrictions upon itself and 
its Representatives? Is this any abridgement of 
popular liberty? The true philc^ophy of Republi- 
can Government, as Ihe history of the world has de- 



monstrated, consists in the establishment of such 
counteracting powers, — powers always^ created by 
the people themselves, — as shall render it morally 
certain that no law can be passed by their servants 
which shall not be in accordance with their will, 
and calculated to promote their good. 

It is for this reason that a Senate has been esta- 
blished in every State of the Union to control the 
House of Rcpreseniative?:- and 1 presume there is 
now scarcely an individual' in the country who is 
not convinced of its necessity. Ffty years ago, 
opinions were much divided upon this subject, and 
nothing but experience has settled the qufstion. In 
France, the National Assembly, although they re- 
tained the King, rejected a Senate as aristocratic, 
and our own Franklin was apposed to it. He 
thought that ibe popular branch was alone neces- 
sary 10 reflect the will of the people, and that a Senate 
would be but a mere incumbrance. His influence 
prevailed in the Convention which framed the first 
Constitution for Pennsylvania, and we had no 
Senate. The Doctor's argument against it was 
contained in one of his homely. but striking illus- 
trations. Why, said he, will you place a horse in 
front cf a cart to draw it forward, ar,d another be- 
hind to pull it back? Experience, which is the 
wisest teacher, has demonstrated the fallacy of 
ibis and all other similar arguments, and public 
opinion is now unanimous on the subject. Where 
is the man who does not now feel that the control 
of a Senate is necessary to restrain and modify the 
action of the popular branch? 

And how is our own Senate composed? One- 
fourth of. the people of this Union, through the 
Hgency of the Slate Legislatures, can send a ma- 
jority into this chamber. A bill may pass the 
House of Representatives by a unanimous vote, 
and jet be defeattd here by a majority, of Senators 
tepiesenting but one-fourth of the people of the 
Uiiited States. Why does not the Senator from 
Kentucky propose lo abolish she Senate? His^ ar- 
gument would' be much stronger against its ex'v- 
tence than asainst that of the veto power in the 
hands of a Chief Magistrate, who, in this particu- 
lar, is the true representative oi the majority of the 
whole people. 

All the beauty and harmony and order of the 
universe arise from counteracting influences. 
When its great Author, in the beginning, gave the 
planets their projectile impuke, they would have 
rushed in a straight line through the realms of 
boundless space, had he not restrained ihem within 
iheir pre-. cribed orbits by the counteracting iuflu- 
t«vice tf gravitation. All the valuable inventions 
in mechanics consist m blending simple powers 
together so as to restrain and re<!^ulate the action of 
each other. Restraint — restraint — not that imposed 
by aribitrafy and irresponsible pov.'er, but by the 
people themselves, in their own written constitu- 
iions, is the great law which has rendered Demo- 
cratic Representative Government so successful in 
these latter times. The best security which the 
people can have against abuses of trus-t \»y their 
public servants, is to ordain that itsnedl be the duly 
of one class of them to watch and restrain another. 
Sir, this Federal Government, iu its legislative at- 
tributes, is nothing but a system of reptrqints from 
beginning to end. In order to enact any bill into a law, 



it must be passed by the representatives of the people 
in the House, and also by the representatives of ihe 
sovereign States in the Senate, where, as I have, 
observed before, it may be defeated by Senatois 
from Stales containing hut one-fourth of the papu- 
lation of ihe couniry. After it has undergone these 
two ordeals, il must yet be subjected to that of the 
Eiccutive, as the tribune of the whole people, for 
his approbation. If he .'■hould exercise bis veto 
power, it cannot beccme a law unless; it be parsed 
by a majority of two thirds of both Hou.'es. 
These aie the mutual restraints which the 
people have imposed on their public fervant-, lo 
preserve their own rights an J those of the Stale- 
from ra-b, hasty, and impolitic legis'ation. No 
treaty with a foreign power can be binding upon 
the people of this c-ouutry unlessit tball leceive the 
assent of the President and two-thirds of the Se- 
nate; and this is the re.'faint which the people 
have imposed on the treaiy-making power. 

All these restraints are peculiarly necpssary to 
protect the lights and preserve the harmony of the 
different States which compo^e our Union. It now 
consists of twen'y-six distinct and icdepend'-nt 
States, and this number maj yet be considerably 
increased. These Stales differ esjeniially from 
each other in tlieir domesiic institutions, in the 
character of their population, and even, to some 
extent, in their langcags. They embrace every 
variety of SO',), clitnate, and productions. In an 
enlarged view, I believe their interests to b- 
all identical; although, to the eye of local and se.- 
tional prejudice, they always appear to be con 
" flicting. In such a condition, mutual jealousies- 
must arise, which can only be repressed by that 
mutual forbearance which pervades the Cons'ita- 
tion. To jcgi.-^lale wisely fur such a people is a 
task of extreme delicacy, and requires much self"- 
restraining prudence and camion. In this point of 
v'ew, I firmly believe that the veto p:-weris one of 
the best safeguards of the Unicn. By this power. 
the majority of the people in every Siate have de- 
creed that the existing laws shall remain unch->nged. 
unless not only a majority in each House of Con- 
gress, but the President also, shall sanction the 
change. By these wise and wholesome restrictions,. 
they have secured themselves, .so far as human 
prudence can, against hasty, oppressive, and dan- 
gerous legiblation. 

The rights of the weaker portions of the Union 
will find one of their g.eatest securities in the veto 
power. It would be easy to imagine interests of 
ihp deepest importance, to particular sections 
which might be seriously endangered by 
its destruction. For example, not more than 
one-third of the Sates have sny direct inte- 
rest in the coasting trade. Tr;i.? trade is now se 
cured to American vsssels, not merely by a protec 
live duty, but by an ab.solute prohibition of all fo- 
reign competition. Suppose the advocates of free 
traderun mad should excite the jealousy of the 
Senators and Representatives from the other two- 
thirdjofthe Stales, against this comparatively lo- 
cal interest, and convince them that this trade 
ought to be thrown open to foreign navigation. By 
such a competition, they mifeht contend that the 
price of freight would be reduced,, and that the pro- 
ducers of cotton, wheat, and other articles, ought 



not to be taxed in order to sustain such a mono- 
poly in favor of our own ship building and naviga- 
ting interest. Siiould Congress, influenced by 
these or any other considerations, ever pass an act 
to open this trade to the competition of fo- 
reisntrs, there is no man fit to fill the Exe- 
cutive tiiair who would not place his veto upon 
It, and thus refer the subject to the sober deiermi- 
nalioa of the American people. To depiivr the 
navigating States of this privilege, woiiiu be to 
aim a deadly bio?/ at the very exisieisce of the 
Union. 

Let me suppose another case of a much more 
dangerfu-s character. In the Southern Sates, 
which compose the weaker portion of the Union, 
a species of property exists which is now attract- 
ing the attention of the whole civilized world. 
These Slates never would have become parties to 
the Union, had not their rights in thi? property- 
been secured by the Federal Constitution. Fo- 
reign and domestic fanatics — some from the belief 
that they are doing God's .service, and others ircm 
a desire lo divide and destroy this glorious Repub- 
lif — have conspired to emancipate the Southern 
.slaves. On this qaestion, the people of the Souih, 
beyjjnd the limiis of their own States, st§ind alone 
and unsupported by any power on earilii, e>.c, pt 
that of the Northern Democracy. These fanaii'cal 
philanthropists are no^/ conducting a cru-aJe 
over the whole world, and are endeavoring to con- 
cent! ate the public opinion of all mankind against 
this r'ght of property. Suppose they should ever 
ii;ifluence a msjority in both Houses of Cor.t.'rf'.s 
to pai-s a law, not to abolish this property — lor that 
would be too palpable a violation of the Constitu- 
tion — but 10 render it of no value, under tl^e ieiter, 
but against the spirit of some one of the powers 
granted: will any lov?r of his country say that the 
President ought not to possess the power of arrest- 
in?, such an act by his veto, until the solemn de- 
cision of the people should be known on this ques- 
tion, involving the life or death cf the' U.'iion'? 
W«=, sir, of the non-slaveholdin^ States, en- 
tered the Union upctn the expre.ss contiitioa 
;hat thi»; property should be protected. Whr-.ievcr 
may be onr own private Oprniotrs in regard to sla- 
trery in the abstract, cusht we to hazard all the 
bleisings of our free institutions — our Union and 
our strength — in st'ch a crusade against our bre- 
'hren of theSouth? Ought we to jeopard every po- 
hiical right we ho d dear»for the sake of enabling 
these fanatics to invatie Southern rights, and render 
ihat fair portion of our common inheritance a scene 
of .verviie war, rapine and murder? Shall we apply 
ihe torch to the magnificent temple of humisn liberty 
which our forefathers reared at the price of their 
blood and treasure., and permit all we hold dear to 
perish in the coLflagraiion'? I trust not. 

It is possible that at some future day the majo- 
rity in Congress may fitt'-rapt, by indirect means, 
to tmancipats the slaves of the South. ; There is no 
knowing through what channel the ever acave spi- 
rit of fanaticism may seek to accomplish its object. 
The attempt may be made through the taxing 
power, or some other express power granted by the 
Constitution. God only knows how it may be made. 
It is hard to say what means fanaticism may not 
adopt to acccmphsh its purpose. Do we feel so 



10 



secure, ia ihLs hour of peril frbm abroad and peril 
at borne, as to be willing to prostrate any of the 
barriers which the Constiiution has reared against 
hasly and dangerous legislation? No, sir, never 
■was -the value ot the veto power more manifest 
than at the present moment. For the weaker por 
tlon of the Union, whose constitutional rights are 
now assailed with such violence, to think of aban- 
doning this safeguard, would be almost suicidal. It 
is my solemn conviciion, that there never was a 
wiser or more beautiful adapfation of theory to 
prac;ice in any Govsrnment than that which re- 
quif es a majarity of two-thirds in both Houses tf 
CoEgrejs to pass an act returned by (he President 
with his objections, under all the high responsibili- 
ties which he 'owes to his country. 

Sir, ours is a glorious Constiiution. Let us ve- 
peraie it— let hs stand by it a's the work of fi;reat 
and good men, unsurpassed in the history of" any 
age or nation. Let us not assail it rashly with our 
invading hands, but honor it as ihe fountain of 
our prosperity and po.ver. Let us protect it as the 
oniy system of Government which could have ren- 
dered us what we are la half a century, and ena- 
bled us to taice the front rank among the nations of 
the earth. In niy opinion, it is the only form of 
Government which can preserve the blessings of 
liberty and prO);periiy to the people, and at the 
same time secure the rights and sovereignly of the 
S'a'es. Sir, the great mass of the people are un- 
willing that it shall be changed. Although the 
Senator from Kentucky, to whom I cannot and do 
not attribuie any but patriotic motives, has brought 
him. elf t(.) believe that a change is necessary, pspe- 
ciaily in the veto power, I must differ from him 
eatirely, convinced that his opinions on this subject 
are ba'^ed upon fallacious theories of the nature of 
our institutions. This view of his opinions is 
strengthened by his declarations the other day as to 
the ijliraitable rights of the majority in Congress. 
On thra point he differs, essisntialiy from the f ramer> 
vC the Constitution. They believed that the people 
of the different States had rights which might be 
violated by such a majority, and the veto power 
■was one of the modes which they devised for pre- 
venting these rights from being invaded. 

The Senator, in support of his objections to the 
veto power, ha« used what he denominates a nu- 
merical argument, and asks, can it be supposed 
that any President will possess more wisdom than 
nine Senators and forty Repre'-eD'atives. (This i? 
the number more than a bare majority of each 
body which would nt present be required to pass a 
bill by a majority of two thirds.) To this qaestion, 
my answer is, no, it is not to be so supposed at all 
All that we have to suppose is, what our ancestors, 
in their acknowledged wisdom, did suppose; that 
Senators and Repres-fntatives are but mortal men, 
endowed with mortal passions and subject to mor- 
tal infirmities; that ihsy are susceptible of selfiih 
and unwise impulses, and that they do not always-, 
and under all circumstances, truly reflect the will 
of their constituents. These founders of our Go- 
vernment, therefore, supposed the possibility that 
Congress might pass an act through the influence 
of unwise or improper motives; and that the best 
mode of saving the country from the evil effects of 
such legislation was to place a qualified veto in the 



hands of the people's own representative, the Pre- 
sident of the United States, by means of which, un- 
less two-thirds of each House of Congress should 
repass the bill, the question must be brought di- 
rectly before the people themselves. These wise 
men had made the President so dependent on Con- 
gress that they knew he would never abuse this 
power, nor exert it unless from the highest and 
most solemn convictions of duty; and experience 
has established their wisdom and foresight. 

As to the Senator's numerical argument, I might 
as well as^k him, is it to be supposed that we are ,so 
superior in wisdom to the members of the House 
that the vote of one Senator ought to annul the 
votes of thirty-two Representatives? And yet the 
bill to repeal the Bankrupt law has just been de- 
feated in this body by a majority of one, although 
it had passed the House by a majority of thirty-two. 
The Senator's numerical argument, if it be good 
for any thing at all, would be good fur the abolitioQ 
of the Senate as well as of the veto; and would lead 
at once to ibe investment of all the powers of legis- 
lation in the popular branch alone. But experi- 
ence has long exploded this theory throughout the 
world. The framers of the Constitution, in con- 
summate wi.'dom, thought proper to impose checks, 
and balances, and restrictions on their Governmental 
agents; and wo betide us, if the day should ever 
arrive when they shall be removed. 

But I must admit that another of the Sena-or's 
a^'gnmen's is perhaps not quite so easily refuted, 
though, I think, it is not very difficult to demon- 
strate its fallacy. It is um!oubte.'ly his strongest 
position. He says that the tendency of the veto 
power is to draw after it all the powers of legisla- 
tion; and that Congress, in passing laws, wiil be 
compelled to consult, n6t the good of the country 
alone, but to ascertain, in the first instance, what 
the President will approve, and then regulate their 
conduct according to his predetermined will. 

This argument presupposes the existence of two 
facts, which must be established before it can have 
the least forci. First, that the Preiident would de- 
part from his proper sphere, and attempt to influ- 
ence the initiatory Ipgislation of Congress: and, se- 
cond, that Congress would be so subservient as to 
orii?;ina'e and pass laws, not according to the dic- 
tates of their own judgment, but in obedience to ^ 
his expressed wishes. Now, sir, does not the Se-' 
nator perceive that his argument proves too much? 
Would not the President ha.ve precisely the same 
influence over Congress, so far as his patronage 
exterds, as if the veto -had never existed at all? 
He would then resemble t' e King of England, 
whose veto povt-er has been almost abandoned for 
the last hundred and fifty years. If the President's 
power and patronage were coextennvs with that of 
the King, he could exercise an influence over Con- 
>Tress similar to that which is now exerted over ihe 
British Parliament, and might control legislation in 
the same manner. 

Thus, sir, you perceive that to deprive the Presi- 
dent of the veto powsr, would afford no remedy 
against Executive influence in Conaress, if the 
President were disposed to exert it. Nay, more — . 
it would encourage him to inteifere secretly with 
our legislative functions, because, deprived of the 
veto power, his only resource would be to intrigne 



11 



wilh members of Congress for the purpose of pre- 
venting the passage of measures which he might 
disapprove. At present this power enables him to 
act openly and boldly, and to state his reasons to 
the cocntry for refusing his assent to any act passed 
by Congres?. 

Again: does not the Senator perceive that this 
argument is a direct attack upon the character of 
Congress? Does he not feel that the wkole weight 
of his argument in favor of abolishing the veto 
power, res's upon the wisdom, iniegrity, and inde- 
pendence of that l)ody? And yet we are told that 
in order to prevent the application of the veto, we 
shall become so subiervient to the Executive, that 
in the passage of laws v/e will consult his wi.-hes 
rather than our own independent judgment. The 
venality and baseness of Congress are the only 
foundations on which such an argument can resi; 
and yet it is the presumption of tht-ir integrity and 
■wisdom on which the Senator relies for the pur- 
pose of proving that the veto pi:wer is wholly un- 
necessary, and ought to be abolished. 

In regard to this thing of lixecutive influence 
over Congress, I have a few words to say. Sir, I 
have been an attentive observer of Congressional 
proceedings for the lavt twenty years, and have 
watched its operations with an obs.erving eye. I 
shall not pretend to say that it does net exist to 
somQ extent; but its power has been greatly over- 
raied. It can never become dangerous to liberty, 
unless ths patronage nf the Government should be 
enormously increased by the pa3^age of such un- 
cons'iituiional and encroaching laws as have hi- 
therto fallen under the blow of the veto power. 

The Executive, indeed, will always have pc^r- 
sonai friends, as well as ardent political supporters 
of his administration in Congress, who will strongly 
incline to view his measures with a favorable eye. 
He will, alsc, have, both in and out of Congress, 
expectants who look to him for a share of the 
patronage at his disposal. But, after all, to what 
does this amoun 1 

Whilst the canvass is proceeding previous to his 
election, the expectations of candidates for office 
will array aroand him a host of ajdent and active 
friends. But what is his ci'ndilicn after the. elec- 
tion has parsed, snd the patronage has been distrt- 
buted? Let me appeal to the scene which wrt all 
witnessed in this city, at and after the inauguration 
of the late Ir^msnted President. It is almost im- 
po-sibie that one office seeker in fifty could Isave 
been gratified. Vi^hat is the natural and necessary 
result of such numerous disappointments? It is to 
irritate the feelings and sour ttie minds of the un- 
successful applicants. They maki? comparisons br- 
■(ween them.wlves and those who have been suc- 
cessful, and self love always exaggerates iheir own 
merits and depreciaies those of their successful 
rivals, to sach an extent, that they believe them- 
selves to have beot^ injured. The President thus 
often makes one inactive friend, because he feels 
himself secure in office, and twenty secret enemies 
awaiting the opportunity to give him a stab when- 
ever a favorable occasion may offer. The Sena- 
tor greatly overrates the powei of Executive in- 
fluence either among the people or in Congress. 
By the time the offices have been all_distributed, 
which is usually done between the inauguration 



and the first regular meeting of Congress thereaf- 
ter, the President has but few boons to oflfer. 

Again: it is always an odious exercise of Exe- 
cutive power to confer offices on members Congress, 
unless under peculiar circumstances, where the 
office seeks the man rather than the man the office. 
In point of fact, but few members can receive ap- 
pointments; and those soliciting them are always 
dete.cted by their conduct. They are immediately 
noted for their subserviency; and from that mo- 
raens their influence with their fellow members is 
gone. 

By far the greatest influence which a President 
cm acquire over Congress, is a reflected influence 
from thf people upon their Representatives This- 
is dependent upon the personal popularity of the 
President, and can never be powerful, unless, from 
the force of his character, and the value of his past 
:«ervices, he has inspired the people with an enthu- 
siastic attachment. A remarkable example of this 
reflected influence was presented in the case of 
General Jackson; and jet it is a h gh compliment 
to the independence, if not to the wisdom of Con- 
gress, that even he could rarely command a ma- 
jority in both its t)ranclies. Still it is certain, not- 
wi'.hstanding, that he presented a most striking, 
example of a powerful Expcutive; and this chiefly 
because he was deservedly strong in the sfFec- 
lions of the people. 

In the vicissitude of human events, we shall 
sometimes have Prei-tdenfd who can, if they please, 
exercise too much, and those who possess too little 
influence over Congress. If we witnessed the one 
extreme during General Jackson's administration, 
we now have the other before our eye,s. For the 
^ake of the contrast, and without the slightest dis- 
respect towards the worthy and amiable individual 
who now occupi^-s the Presidential chair, I would 
s.-.y that if General Jackson presented an example 
of the strengih, the present President presents an 
equally striking example of ihefecbienes?, of Execu- 
tive influence. I ask what has all the patronage of 
his higti iffice done for him? How many friends 
has it secured? i most sincirrely wish, for the 
good of the country, and for the success of his ad- 
ministration, that he had a much greater degree of 
influence in Congress than he povse-.ses. It is for 
this reascn that 1 was glad to ob=eive, a few days 
ago, some symptoms of returning favor on this 
(ihe V/iiiu) side of the house towards John Ty- 
ler. It is better, much better, even thus late, that 
they should come forward and extend to him a 
helping hand, than wishing to do so, still keep 
at a dis'ance merely to preserve an appearance of 
consiiiency. I am sorry to see that from this mere 
p.fFeciaiioD, they should appear so coy, and leave 
the country to suffer all the embarrassments which 
result from a weak Admistration. [Here several 
of the Whig Sejnators asked jocosely why the De- 
mocrats did not volunteer tl!eir.Teivice.s lo strength- 
en the Government.] ,0a ! said Mr. B. we cannot 
do that. What is merely an apparent inconsis- 
tency in the Whigs, would be a real inconsistency 
ia us. We cannot go for the Whig measures 
which were approved by President Tyler at the 
extra session. We cannot support the great Go- 
vernment Exchequer Bank of discount and ex- 
change, wiih its three for-one paper currency, i 



12 



think, however, with all deference, that my Whig 
friends on this sideoflhe Flouse ought not to be 
squeamish ou that subject. I think my friend 
from Georgia [Mr. Berkjen] ousbt to go heart 
and hand for the Excktquer Bank. It is in sub 
stance his own fchenee of s. "Fi-cal Corporation," 
transferred into [he Treasury cf the Uniied Siaies, 
and diverted of private sioiikholdeis. Let me as- 
sure gentlemeu that their char.'s.cer for con.sistency 
wii! not suffer by suppor'ii g!h:s measure. 

And yet, with the ezamp'e of this Administra 
tion before their eyes, the Whigs dread Executive 
influence so much that they wish to abolish the 
veto powcr, lest ibe President may be able lo ihaw 
within its vortex e!! the legislative powers of 
Congress ! What a world we live ;n ! 

This authentic history is the best answer to ano- 
ther position of the Senator. W.hilst he believes 
that there have been nofncroachrrients of ihe Ge- 
ncial Government on the lights of the States, but 
on the contrary that it is fast sinking into the weak- 
ness and imbecility of the Confederation; he com- 
plains of the encroachmpn!s wh'ch he alkses to 
have been made by ihe President on the kgiiimate 
powers of Congress. 1 differ from him eniiiely 
in both these propositions, and am only sorry thai 
the subject of the veto power b one so va^t that lime 
will not permit me to discuss iheia at present. 
This I sball, however, say, that the slr< ng tendency 
cf the Federal Government has, in my opinion, 
■ever been to encroach upon the rights of the States 
end their pecp!t; and I migiit appeal to its history 
to esisb.'ish the positioTi. Every Violent struggle, 
threatening the existence of the Union, which has 
existed in this country from the beginning, has 
arisen from the exercise of coiistruciiveand doubt- 
ful powers, not by the Previdf^nt, but by "Congress. 
Bu' enough of this for the present. 

The Senator from Kentucky contends, thdt whe- 
ihenheExectuivebe strong or weak, Congress must 
conform its action to bii v/ishes; and if they can- 
not obtain what they desire^ they must take what 
(hey can get. Such a principle of action is al- 
ways wrong in itself, arid must always lead to th» 
destruction of the party vhich adopts it. ThiJ 
was the fatal error of the Senaior and his friends 
at the extra session. He has informed vis that nei- 
ther "the Fiscal Bank" nor "the Fiscal Corpora- 
lion" of that never to be forgotten session would 
have leceived twenty votes iu either House, had 
the minds of members been kfi uninfluenced by 
the, expected action of the Executive. This was 
the most severe censure which he could have 
passed on his party in Congress. It is now ad^'it'ed 
that the Whig party earnestly advocated and 
adopted two most importatit measures, not because 
they approved them in the form in which they 
were presented, but for the sake of conciliating Mr. 
Tyler. Never was there a more striking example 
of retributive justice than the veto of both these 
measures. Whether it be the fact, as the Senator 
alleges, that the Whigs in Congress took the Fis- 
cal Corporation bill, letier for letter, as it came 
from the President lo th>?m, I shall not pretend to 
decide. It is not for me to compose such strifes. 
I leave this to their own file leaders. Without en 
teringHpon this question, I shall never fail, when a 
£l opportunity offers, to express tht? gratitude which 



I feel, in common with the whole country, to the Pre- 
sident for having vetoed those bills which it now ap- 
pears never received the approbation of any person. 
It docs astonish me, however, that ihis pioceeding 
between the President and his party in Congress 
should ever have been made an argument in la* 
vor of abolishing the veto power. 

This argument, if it prove any thing at all, .«=ets 
the teal of condemnation to the measures of the 
late esira session, and to the extra se.^'ion it.'^elf. 
It is a demonstration of the hasty, inconsiderate 
and immalLue legislation of (hat session. In the 
flush of .party triumph, iHe Whig? rushed into it, 
before paction had time to cool down into that 
calm deliberation, so essential to the wise and har- 
monious co-operation of the different branches of 
the Government. They took so liiile Dine to con- 
sult and to deliberate, to reconcile their conflicting 
opinions and intercHs, and above all to ascertain 
and fix their real political principles \'?hirh tWey 
had so sedulously concealed from the public eye 
throughout the contest, that none but those who 
were hea'ed sr.d excited beyond the bounds of rea- ' 
son ever anticipated any re.'-ult but division, dis- 
as:er and defeat, from ihe extra se!?sicn. The party 
first pursued a course which must have inevitably 
led to ihs defeat which they have exp-?rif need ; and 
would then revenge themselves for their own mis- 
cotiduct by assailing the veio power. 

The lesson which we have received will teach 
Consress hereafter not to sacrifice its independence 
by consulting the Executive will. Let ihem 
honestly ?.nd firmly pass such ac!s ?.s they believe 
the public good requires. They v/ill then have done 
their duy. Afterwards let the Executive exercise 
the same honesty and firmness i> approving these 
ac's. If he vetoes any one of them, he is respon- 
sible to the people, and there he ougnt to be left. 

Had this course been pursued at the extra ses- 
sion. Congress would have passed an set to esta- 
blish an old fashioned Bank of the United States, 
which would have been vfttced by the President. 
A fair issue would thus have been made for the 
decision of their common constituents. There 
would then have been no pece.'siiy for my friends 
on this side of ihe boure to submit lo the humilia- 
tion of justifying themselves before the people, on 
tht,' principle that they were wilbng to accept 
someihicg v/hich they knew lo be very bad, be- 
cause they could not obtain that which they thought 
ihR public good demanded. 

This whole proceeding, sir, presents no argu- 
ment against the veto power; al hough it docs pre- 
sent, in a striking; bghi, ihe subserviency of the 
Whig party in Corgress to E-xeculive dictation. 
We may, indeed, if insensible to our own rights 
and independence, give an undue infijence lo the 
veto pow.-'r; but we shall never produce this effect 
if we confine ourselves lo our own appropriate <3a- 
ties, and leave theE.xecuiive to perform his. This 
example will nevtr, i think, be imitated by any 
psriy in the ccun'.ry, and we shall then never 
^gain be tempted to make war on the veto power. 

To show that this power ought to be abolished, 
the Senator has referred to intimations given on 
this floor, during the administration of General 
Jackson, that such and such acts then pending 
would be vetoed, if passed. Such intimations may 



15 



can be most usefully and properly applied. The 
President of the United Stales stands "solitary and 
alone," in his responsibility to the people. In the ex- 
ercise of this power, he is emphatically the repre- 
sentative ot the whole people. He has the same 
feeling of respcnsibility towards the people at large, 
which actuates us towards our immediate constitu- 
ents. To him the mass of the p opie must 
look as their especial agent ; and human 
ingenuity cannot deVue a better mode of giving 
them the necessary control than by enabling him 
to appeal to themselves in such cases, by means 
of the veto power, for the purpose of asrei- 
taining wheiht-r they will sanction the acts of their 
Representative?. He can bring each of those mea- 
sures distinctly before the people for their separate 
consideration, which may have been adopted by 
log-rolling as parts of a great system. 

The veto power has long ben in exislence in 
Pennsylvania, and has been often exercised, anri 
yet, to ray knov/ledg..', it never has been eyerted in 
any important case, except m obedience to the public 
will, or in promotion of the interests of the people 
Simon Snytier, ■Rhofe far-seeing sag=.city delected 
the evils of our present banking system, whilst they 
were yet comparatively in embryo, has rendereO 
himself immonal by his veto of the forty banks. 
The system, however, was only arrested, not de- 
stroyed, and we are now suffering the evils. The 
present Governor has had the wisdom and courage 
repeatedly to exeicise the veto power, and always, 
I believe, with public approbation. In a late s g 
nal instance, his veto was ovenuled, and the law 
passed by a majority of two-thirds in both Houses, 
altkough I am convinced that at least three fourths 
of the people of the State are opposed to the mea 
sure. 

In the State of Pennsylvania, we regard the veto 
power with peculiar favor. la the convention of 
1837, which was held for the purpose of proposing 
amendments to our Con^'itutrot), the identical pro- 
position now rap.de by ihe Senator from K'-ntucky 
was brought forward, and vi'as repudiated by a vote 
of 103 to 14. This convention was composed ol 
he ablest and most practical men in the S.ate, and 
was almost equally divided between the two great 
rival parties of the country; and yet, in that body, 
but fourteen individuals could be found who were 
willing to change the Constitution in this particular. 

Whilst the framers of the Constitution thought, 
and thought wisely, that in order to give this powe? 
the practical effect they designed, it was necessary 
that any bill which was vetoed should be arrested, 
notwithstanding a majority of Congress might af- 
terwards approve the measure; on the other hand, 
they restrained the power, by conferiing on two- 
thirds of each House the authority to enact the bill 
into a law, notwithstanding the veto of the Presi- 
■dent. Thus the existence, the exercise, and the re- 
straint of the power are all harmoniously blended. 
and afford a striking example of the mutual 
checks and ba ances of the Constitution, so admi 
rably adapied to preserve the rights ot the States 
and of the people. 

The last reason to which I shall advert why the 
veto power was adopted, and ought to be preserv- 
ed, I shall state in the language of the seventy-third 
number of the Federalist: 

"Th« propensity (says the author) of the Legislative Depart- 
016111 to intrude upon the rights, and w absorb the powers of ttis 



other departmenta, has been already more than once suggested. 
The insufficiency ofa mere parchment delineation of the boun- 
daries of each, has also l)een remarlced upon, and the necessity 
of furnishing each with constitutional arms lor its own defence, 
has been interred and proved. From these clear and indubita- 
ble principles results the propriety of a negative, eiiher abso- 
lute or (jualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legisla- 
tive branches." 

The Executive, which is the weaker branch, in 
the opinion of the Federalist, ought not be left at 
the mercy of Congrcs.s, "but ought to possess a 
con.'tiiulional and effectual power of self-defence." 
It ought to be able to resist encroachments on its 
constitutional rights. ' 

I admit that no necessity has ever existed to use 
the veto power for the protection of the Executive, 
unless it may possibly have been in a single in- 
stance; ai^d in it there was evidently no intention to 
invade his rightful power.?. I rufer to the "Act to 
appoint a dsy for the aniiual meeting of Congress." 
This act had pas.sed the Set a'e by a majirity of 34 
to 8; but when it was returned to this body by 
General Jackson with his objection?, the majority 
was reversed, and the vote stood but 16 in favor 
to 23 against its passage. 

The knowledge of the exis'ence of this veto 
power, as the framers of the Constitution foresaw, 
has doub'less exerted a restraining influence on 
Congress. That body have never attempted to in- 
vade any of the high Eiecutive powers. Whilst 
such attempts have been made by them to violate 
the righti;of the States and of the people, and have 
been vetoed, a sense of justice, as well as the .'^ilent 
restraining influence which proceeds from a know- 
ledge thai the President possesses the means of self 
protection, has relieved him from the necessity of 
using the veto for- this purpose. 

Mr. President, I did not think, at the time of its 
delivery, that the speech of the distinguished Sena- 
tor from Kentucky was one of great power; al- 
though we all know that nothing he can utter is de- 
void of eloquence and interest. 1 mean only to say 
that I did not then believe his speech was charac- 
terized by his u-.ual ability; and i was di.'^posed to 
attribute this to the fecb'e state of his health and 
the consequent want of his usual buoyancy of 
spirit. Since ! have seen it in print, I have ohangM 
my opinion; and foj the first time in my life I have 
believed that a speech of his could appear better 
and more effecti.e in the reading than in tiie de- 
livery. I do lot mean to insinuate that any thing 
was added in the report of it; for I believe it con- 
tains all the arguments used by the Senator and 
;io more; but I was astonished to find, upon a care- 
ful examination, that every possible argument had 
besn urged which could be used in a cause so hope- 
less. This is my apology lor having detained the 
Senate so long in attempting to answer it. 

[Mr. Clay observed that he never saw the speech, 
as written out by the Reporter, till he read it in 
print the next morning; and, although he found 
some ejrors and mi.'sconceptions, yet, on the whole, 
it was very correct, and, as well as he could recol- 
lect, contained all the arguments he did make use 
of, and no more.] 

Mr. Buchanan. I did not intend, as must hsve 
been evident to the Senator, to produce the impres- 
siotl that any thing had been added. My only 
purpose was to say that it was a better speech fhaa 
thad supposed, and thus to apologise to the Senate 
for the time I had consumed in answering it. 

I shall briefly refer to two other arguments urgeti 



16 



ty the Senator, and shall then take my seat. Why, 
says he, should the President possess the veto pow- 
er for his protection, whilst it is not accorded to 
the Judiciary? The answer is very easy. It is 
true that this power has not been granted to the 
Judiciary in form; but they posses? it in fact to a 
much greater extent than the Presi'ient. The Chief 
Justice tf the United Slates and his asst ciate?, 
sitting in the gloomy chamber beneath, (xercive 
the tremendous and irrcponsible power of saying 
to ail the departments of the Government, "hitherto 
shalt thou go, and no further." They exercis-e the 
prerogative of anu'iling laws passed by Congress, 
and approved by the President, whenever in their 
opinion, the legislative authority has trprt.-cended 
its constitutional limits. Is not this a self-protect- 
ing power much more formidable than the veto of 
the President? Two-thirds of Congress; may over- 
rule tiie Executive veto; but the whole of Congress 
and the President united, cannot overrule the de- 
cisions of the Supreme Court. Theirs is a vet.' 
on the action of the whole Government. I do not 
say ihai ihiis power, formidable as it may be, ought 
not to exist: on the contrary, I consider it lo be 
one of the wise checks which the frame rs of the 
Constitution have provided against hasty and uncon- 
stitutional legislation, and is a part of (he great system 
of mutual restraints which the p=ople have im- 
posed on their servants for their own protection. 
This, hov/ever, I will say, and that wih the most 
sincere respect for the individual judges; that in 
my opinion, the whole train of their decisions from 
the beginning favors the power ot the Genera! Go- 
vern nient at the, expense of State rights and 
S a'e Fovereignty. Where, I ask, is the case to be 
found upon their record*, in which they have ever 
dfcided that any act of Cungrets, from the alien 
an! s dition laws un'il the present day, was un- 
censntutional, provided it extended the powers of the 
Federal Government? Truly they are abundantly 
able to protect their own rights and jurisdiction 
against eriiier Congress or the Executive, or both 
unire-i. 

Again: the Senator asks, why has not the veto 
heen ^'wen to the President on iha acts of coaven- 
tions held for the purpose of amending our Consti^ 
tutious? ir it be necessary to restrain Congress, it 
is equally necessary, say.-< be, to restrain conven- 
tions. The answer to this argument is equally 
easy. It T«fould be absurd to grant an appeal, 
through the intervention of the veto, to the people 
themselves, against their own acl-f. They create 
conventions by virtue of their oxn undelegated 
and inalienable sovereignty; and when they apeak, 
fheir servants, whether Legislative, Executive, or 
Judicial, must be silent. Besides, when they pro- 
ceed to exercise their sovereign power in changing 
the forais of their Government, they are peculiarly 
careful in the selection of their delegates — they 
watch over the proceedings with vigilant care, and 
the Consiilu'.ion proposed, by such a convention, 
h never adopted untii after it has been submitted 
10 'h:' vote of the peop!e. It is a mere proposition 
to ;hc people themselves, aod leaves no room for 
the action of the veto power. 

[Here iMr. Clay observed, that Cotesiftutions, 
thus formed, were not afterwards submitted to the 
^people.] % 

Mr. Buchanan. For many years past, I believe 
that this has always been done, as it always ought 
to 6e done, in the States: and the Federal Consti- 



tution was not adopted until after it had been s),. 
mi tied to a convention of the people of evei 
State in the Union. 

So much in regard to the States. The Senatp; 
argument hasnoapplicaiion whatever to the Feder; 
Con- tituuon, which has provided the mode of its aw 
amendment. It requires two-thirds of both Hoase 
the very majority required to overrule a Presidei 
tial veto, even to propose any amendment; and b 
fore such an amendment can be adopted, it mu 
be ratified by the Lrgislature?, or by convention! 
iH three-fourihs of the several Staies. To stai 
this proposition, is to manifest the absurdity, na.' 
the impossibility of applying the veto power of ti 
President to amendments, which have thus bee 
previously ratified by such an overwhelming e: 
pression of the public will. This Constilution ( 
ours, with ail its checks and balances, is a wondie 
;ul invs"uticn of human wisdom. Founded upc 
the most just philos; phical principles, and l\ 
deepest knowledge of the nature of man, it pre 
duces harmony, happiness, and order, from el 
ments, which, to the superficial observer, mi^ 
appear to be discordant. 

On the whole, I trust not only that this ve 
power may not be destroyed, bat that the vote f 
the Senator's amendment may be of suchachara 
ter as to settle the question, at least during the pr 
sent generation. Sir, of all the Executive power 
it is the one least to be dreaded. li cannot creat 
it can originate no measure; it can change i 
exi-titig law; it can destroy no existing instiiutio) 
It is a mere power to arrest haily and inconsid' 
rale changes, until the voice of the people, who at 
alike the masters of Senators, Representatives ac 
President, shall be heard.. When it speaks, v 
must all bow with deference lo the decree. Publ 
opinion is irresistible in ihi-j country. It will a<' 
complish its purpo.e by the removal of Senator 
Representatives, or President, who may stand <n i 
way. The President might as well attempt 1 
stay Ibe tides of the ocean by erecting mounds ( 
sand, as to think of conlroliing the will of the pei 
pie by the veto power. The monnting waves ( 
popular opinion would scon prostrate such a fe: 
ble barrier. The veto power is every thing whe 
jus'ained by public opinion; but nothing without i 
What io this Constitution under which we liv: 
and what are we? Are we not the most prospe 
ou?, the most free, and amoiigst the most powerfr 
nations on the face of the cgr'h? Have we not a; 
tainedthis preeRiinence, in a period brief beyond any examp 
recorded in liistory, uniler the benign influence of this Consi 
tiuion, and llie laws which have been passed under its auth 
rityl Why, then, should we, with rude hands, tear aw 
one of the cords from this wisely balanced instrument, a 
thus incur the danger of impairing or destroying the barn) 
iiy and vigorous aciion of the wholel The !*enator from Ke 
tucky has not, in my opinion, furnished us with any suffici 
reasons. 

And after all, what harm can this veto power ever do7 
can never delay the passage of a great public measure, 
manded by the people, more than two, or at the moaf, fi 
years. Is it not better, then, to submit to this possible inc- 
venience, (for it has never yet occurred,) than to destroy i 
power altogether'? It is not probable that it ever will occur; i 
cause if iho President should disregani ihe will of the people > 
any important constitutional measure which they desired, ' 
would sign his own political death warrant. No Preside 
will ever knowingly attempt to do it; and his means of kno^ 
ledge, from tile ordeal through which he must have passed pr 
vious to his election, are superior to those of any other inaiv 
dual. He will never, unless in cases scarcely to'be imagine( 
resist the public will when fairly expressed. It is beyond th 
nature of things to believe otherwise. The veto power is ths 
feature of our Constitution which is most conservative of it 
rights of the Slates and the rights of the people, May it be pe 
petUal I 



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